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Note
High Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral
Use of Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanors
Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasarand
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Lily Fu

In 1983, a Georgia state court convicted Kenneth Nichols of
misdemeanor drunken driving without appointing a defense attorney to represent him.' Because Nichols did not receive a jail
sentence, his conviction and $250 fine did not violate his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel. 2 Eight years later, Nichols was
again convicted, this time of drug-related criminal activity. A

federal judge used Nichols' prior, uncounseled misdemeanor

conviction to increase his criminal history score under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines,3 thereby adding two years
to the seventeen year prison sentence Nichols otherwise would

have received for the offense.4 Nichols challenged the additional prison time as violating his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.5 Nichols argued that in effect, he was being incarcerated for the prior, uncounseled conviction, for which he did not
6
have the benefit of counsel.
In a bench opinion rejecting Nichols' constitutional chal1. United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 278 (E.D. Tenn. 1991). A
district court later considering this conviction assumed that Nichols did not
waive his right to counsel in these proceedings, since no evidence of waiver appeared on record. I&
2. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (5-4 decision). For an explanation of the Court's holding in Scott, see infra notes 36-40 and accompanying
text
3. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 278-80.
4. I& at 281. The court sentenced Nichols to 235 months of imprisonment, 25 months more than would have otherwise been authorized had the
prior uncounseled misdemeanor been disregarded. I& In its determination to
sentence Nichols at the top of his authorized guideline range, the court in part
relied upon evidence of Nichols' 1988 involvement in other drug-related activity which never led to conviction. Id- at 280-81.
5. Id, at 279.
6. I& at 278-80.
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lenge, the sentencing court determined that the Supreme
Court's decision in Baldasar v. Illinois was inapplicable. 7 In
Baldasar,the Court held unconstitutional the collateral use of a
prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony conviction carrying a greater
prison term.8 Although a majority of the Court voted to reverse Thomas Baldasar's felony conviction and enhanced sentence, only four justices reasoned that no valid, uncounseled
prior misdemeanor convictions can be constitutionally used to
enhance sentences in subsequent offenses.9 Four justices dissented, further obscuring the scope of the decision. 10 Unsurprisingly, the sentencing court found no guidance from the
Supreme Court's opinion, and distinguished Baldasar on its
facts."
As a result of the ambiguous Baldasar opinion, countless
trial courts every day sentence criminal defendants such as
Kenneth Nichols to prison, unsure of the constitutionality of
using uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for sentence enhancement. The United States Sentencing Guidelines clearly
mandate the result in United States v. Nichols, instructing federal courts to use all prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for sentence enhancement.12 The Guidelines, however, so
conflict with the apparent holding of Baldasarthat despite the
provisions' unequivocal terms, lower federal courts have applied them inconsistently.' 3 Without Supreme Court clarifica7. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 224-30.
9. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.

11. United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 279-80 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
12. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
13. Within the last two years, conflicting views of the effect of Baldasar
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has resulted in a split of opinion be-

tween circuits. Compare United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that any term of imprisonment based on a prior uncounseled

conviction violates the Sixth Amendment) with United States v. Eckford 910
F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions can be considered in imposing subsequent sentences). Explicit statements anticipating or lamenting the confusion Baldasar creates abound in

opinions addressing the issue. See, e.g., Baldasar v. illinois, 446 U.S. at 222,
235 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[flollowing today's pronouncement, there is no way to predict the outcome" of any constitutional challenge
to the collateral use of prior uncounseled misdemeanors); Moore v. Georgia,

484 U.S. 904, 905 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that because "the confusion over Baldasar'sholding has led to uneven application of that case and
conflicting decisions in the courts below, [he] would grant certiorari here to

answer the outstanding questions concerning Baldasarsscope and proper ap-
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tion of Baldasar, the scope of a basic constitutional right of
hundreds of criminal defendants remains shrouded in
uncertainty.14
This Note examines the propriety of using prior, uncounseled misdemeanors to enhance sentences in subsequent convictions, particularly under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Part I traces judicial development of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, details Balasar v. Illinois' landmark extension of that right, and delineates the United States Sentencing
Commission's and lower courts' applications of Baldasar. Part
II analyzes interpretive approaches adopted by two disagreeing
federal circuits applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Part IH posits that no discernible rule emerges from Baldasar
v. Illinois, and advocates Supreme Court review to clarify the
nebulous state of the law. This Note concludes that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions, valid in their original proceedings, should also be constitutionally valid for enhancing
sentences collaterally.
plication.") den ing cert to 352 SE.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Schindler v.
Clerk of Circuit Ct., 715 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984) ("In light of... the failure of the Baldasar majority to agree upon a
rationale for its result, the scope of the decision remains unclear."); United
States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) ('"The court in
Baldasar divided in such a way that no rule can be said to have resulted."),
cerL denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
14. Although beyond the inquiry of this Note, the ambiguity of the
Baldasar opinion poses a problem that extends beyond the federal system to
perplex a myriad of state courts sentencing defendants under enhanced penalty statutes that take into account prior, uncounseled misdemeanors. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 61 (Pa. 1986) (holding valid
the use of prior, uncounseled theft convictions to enhance sentence for later
theft conviction) and State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 173 (N.D. 1985) (holding
valid the use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions to enhance subsequent sentence only if valid waiver of right to counsel existed for prior conviction) with State v. Oehm, 680 P.2d 309, 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting
use of prior uncounseled conviction for driving while intoxicated to enhance
subsequent driving while intoxicated sentence under second offense statute)
and State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d 671, 678 (Me. 1984) (holding that prior uncounseled driving while intoxicated convictions cannot be used to trigger statutory
enhancement of the penalty for a second offense).
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I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND ITS EXTENSION TO
THE COLLATERAL USE OF PRIOR,
UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANORS
A. THE ROAD To THE RIGHT
CASES

TO

COUNSEL

IN

MISDEMEANOR

1. Right to Counsel in Felony Cases
The evolution of the right to counsel was not an inevitable
process. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."' 5 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[Nior shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ... ."16 For the first century and a half
following the enactment of the Sixth Amendment, the question
of a defendant's right to counsel was seldom litigated. Some
commentators have noted that the drafters of the Bill of Rights
probably intended only to prevent federal courts from barring
an accused from hiring defense counsel.17 In 1932 however, the
Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama'8 that four disadvantaged, illiterate youths charged with capital rape possessed a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to courtfurnished defense counsel.19 The Powell court reasoned that to
comport with constitutional due process requirements, trial
courts must grant defendants a "right to be heard" in criminal
15.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

16. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See, eg., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.); WILLiAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL iN AmEmcAN CouRTs 27-30 (1955).

But cf Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1932) (Sutherland, J.) (documenting a right of counsel in the early constitutions of at least 12 of 13 colonies that included the affirmative right of defendants to be provided defense
counsel).
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The famous Scottsboro defendants, Ozie Powell,
Willie Roberson, Andy Wright, and Olen Montgomery, were convicted of raping two white girls. Under Alabama statute, juries determine sentences for
rape, within a range" of 10 years' imprisonment to death. Amid widespread ra-

cial hostility in the community against the defendants, the jury in Powell imposed the death penalty upon all four youths. Id. at 49-56. The record reflects
that until the day of trial, 'no lawyer had been named or definitely designated
to represent the defendants." I at 56.
19. The Court stated that in "a capital case, where the defendant is unable

to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law." Id at 71.
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proceedings. 20 This right to a hearing, according to the Court,
would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law

...

He

lacks bath the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.2

Thus, the Court in Powell equated the right to court-appointed

counsel, even for the "intelligent and educated layman,"22 with
the very basic right of a criminal defendant to be heard in
court.2
Thirty-one years later, the Supreme Court in Gideon v.

Wainwright24 explicitly held the right to counsel a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 25 Incorporating the right to
counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court emphasized that in an adversarial criminal justice system, courts must consider representation by defense counsel
20. Id. at 68-69.
21. I& at 69.
22. I
23. A decade after Powell, the Court in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942),
held that although the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the aid of
counsel in federal trials, the right to counsel itself was not a right fundamental
to a fair trial; therefore, states did not need to appoint counsel for every indigent accused felon to comply with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. 316 U.S. at 461-63 & n.13. Betts licensed state trial courts to
determine whether appointment of counsel would be necessary to ensure a
fair trial by individually performing "an appraisal of the totality of facts" in
each case. Id at 462. In Betts, the indigent petitioner requested appointed

counsel at his arraignment hearing, but was refused because the custom of the
Maryland trial court was to furnish court-appointed counsel only to defendants charged with murder or rape. Betts was tried before a judge, convicted of

felony robbery, and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Id. at 456-57. The
holding in Betts ran contrary to some of the broader language in Powell and
directly contrary to the Court's holding four years earlier in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson held that the Sixth Amendment required
court-appointed defense counsel in all federal trials of indigent defendants
who do not waive the right to counsel. Id. at 467-68.
The Court later overruled Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339
(1963). Gideon, however, did not reinstate the absolute right to counsel in
Johnson. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Clarence Earl Gideon, charged with the felony of
breaking and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, requested court-appointed counsel as an indigent but was refused on the ground
that Florida trial courts furnished counsel only to indigent defendants in capital cases. The jury convicted Gideon and sentenced him to five years imprisonment. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction. Id.
25. Id. at 342-45 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1942)).
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requisite to fair proceedings. 2

Despite its sweeping language, Gideon did not definitively
set forth the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan qualified the holding of
Gideon, stating that it required court-appointed counsel only
for defendants charged with "offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison senJustice Harlan then stated parenthetically:
tence." 27
"[w]hether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need
not now be decided."28 As a result, courts widely interpreted
the right to counsel announced in Gideon to extend only to accused felons and not to accused misdemeanants. 29 In the nine
years following Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to cases questioning whether the right to counsel
attached to misdemeanor convictions.30
2. Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
The Court at last faced the issue unresolved by Gideon in
its 1972 decision of Argersingerv. Hamlin.31 Argersinger held
that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may
be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
his trial." s2 To support its decision to extend the right to coun26. I& at 344. "Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime
Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who
....

fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses
.... [These are] the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries." I& Aside from policy
considerations, the Court relied upon precedent, citing, inter alia, Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) to but-

tress its ruling. I&i at 343.
27. Id at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
28. ICE
29. For a list of citations to lower court and Supreme Court cases that appear to limit the holding in Gideon to accused felons, see David S. Rudstein,

The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor ConvictionsAfter Scott and
Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 523 nn.25 & 26 (1982).
30. For a list of citations to such certiorari-denied cases, see ii at 523-24
n.27.
31. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Indigent petitioner Argersinger was charged with

carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor punishable defense by up to six
months' imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both. Without appointing defense

counsel, the court convicted Argersinger and sentenced him to 90 days' imprisonment. Id. at 26.

32. Id. at 37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Although the holding

in Argersingerextended the right to counsel to all defendants sentenced to im-
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sel to misdemeanor convictions resulting in actual imprisonment, the Court relied on Powell and Gideon principles
regarding the fundamental nature of the right to counsel to ensure indigent defendants receive a fair hearing. 33 The Court
recognized that when the serious consequence of imprisonment
is involved, the right to counsel is no less critical in misdemeanor convictions than in felony convictions.34
Although Argersingermade clear that trial courts may not
constitutionally impose a term of imprisonment in misdemeanor cases without providing the defendant with court-appointed counsel, the decision explicitly left open the question of
whether the Sixth Amendment requires court-appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases where a jail term is statutorily authorized, but not actually imposed.s5 The Supreme Court
addressed that question seven years later in Scott v. Illinois,3s a
case that represents the current state of the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases.
Scott restated the "actual imprisonment" standard utilized
in Argersinger,37 holding conclusively that the right to counsel
prisonment, Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
suggested a different standard by which to define the scope of the constitutional right to counsel. Justice Powell's standard would have extended the
right without reservation to all cases in which more than six months' imprisonment is authorized. In "petty" cases - where the authorized imprisonment
is less than six months - the trial court would have discretion to determine
the right to counsel on a case-by-case basis. Such a determination, to be made
before the defendant pleads, would then be subject to appellate review. Id. at
46, 63.
33. Id-at 32-33.
34. Id. at 34-37. The court also considered the "'insufficient and frequently irresponsible"' treatment of misdemeanor cases in backlogged trial
courts in its decision to extend the right to counsel. Id. at 35 (quoting William
E. Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal,
28 THE LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE, 151, 152 (1970)).
35. "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for
here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail." I& at 37.
36. 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (5-4 decision). Unrepresented by counsel at a
bench trial, petitioner Scott was convicted of misdemeanor theft and fined $50.
Id- at 368. Under an Illinois statute, the maximum penalty authorized for
Scott's alleged offense was one year's imprisonment, a $500 fine, or bath. Id.
The Illinois Appellate Court, Illinois Supreme Court, and United States
Supreme Court all rejected Scott's Sixth Amendment challenge to the conviction and fine. Id at 368-69, 373-74.
37. Id at 373. The Court was persuaded that the Argersingerformulation
of the right to counsel standard was intended to limit the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases because the Argersinger Court chose the "actual imprisonment" standard from several plausible options presented by briefs filed in the
case. See id at 373 n.4. Among those options were a right to counsel for all
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attaches only in misdemeanor convictions resulting in imprison-

ment.e The Court accordingly refused to extend the constitutional right to counsel to Scott, an unrepresented, indigent

defendant who was fined, but not sentenced to prison.39 In deciding Scott v. Illinois, Justice Powell noted the imperative for

a clear standard to define the right to counsel of a multitude of
criminal defendants. 4° The Court failed to meet this imperative
the next year when it decided Baldasarv. Illinois.
B. THE EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO SENTENCES
COLLATERALLY ENHANCED BY PRIOR, UNCOUNSELED

MISDEMEANORS
For criminal defendants who commit subsequent offenses,
the consequences of an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction do
not always end with a fine or probation. Many states' criminal
statutes 4 ' and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 42 permit the
collateral use of prior misdemeanors to enhance sentences
under subsequent convictions. These provisions punish recidi-

vism by looking to a defendant's previous conviction record to
increase the grading and severity of punishment for a particular offense. 43 Baldasarv. Illinois questioned whether such col-

laterally imposed sentences constitute "actual imprisonment"
without counsel, which Scott prohibits.
cases in which any imprisonment was authorized and a right to counsel only
for cases in which more than six months' imprisonment was authorized. Id
38. Id at 373-74.
39. Id at 369.
40. See id at 374 (Powell, J., concurring) ("It is important that this Court
provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the country that confront this problem daily.").
41. For an example of such a penalty enhancement provision, see the statute-applied in Baldasarv. lBlinois, infra note 47.
42. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §§ 4A1.11.3 (Nov. 1991).
43. The United States Sentencing Commission has explained the sentencing policy behind the recidivist provision:
A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable
than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear message be
sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the
need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public
from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be considered.
U.S.S.G. Ch.4, Pt.A, intro. comment.
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1. Baldasarv. Illinois
Baldasar v. Illinois" involved sentence enhancement
under an Illinois repeat-offender statute. In May 1975, Thomas
Baldasar was convicted of misdemeanor theft in an uncounseled proceeding, fined $159, and sentenced to one year of probation.45 Six months later, Baldasar allegedly shoplifted a $29
shower head from a department store, and was again charged
with misdemeanor theft.4 In this proceeding, the prosecution
introduced evidence of Baldasar's prior, uncounseled conviction
to convert the misdemeanor charge into a felony charge under
an Illinois penalty enhancement statute.47 The jury returned a
guilty verdict and sentenced Baldasar to prison for one to three
years.48 Because the jury convicted him of a felony, Baldasar
received a prison term in excess of the maximum sentence he
could have received under an unenhanced misdemeanor conviction.49 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction
and sentence, 5 0 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 51
In a per curiam decision, five members of the Court - Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens voted to reverse Baldasar's felony conviction and enhanced sentence. 52 Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun each wrote
a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. These three
concurrences espoused two distinct theories supporting
reversal.5 s
Justice Stewart's three-sentence concurrence, joined by
Justices Brennan and Stevens, offered no rationale untreated
by Justice Marshall's concurrence.m Justice Marshall's concur44. 446 U.S. 222 (1980)

(per curiam).

45. I& at 223.

46. Id
47. Id Illinois criminal statutes provide that a first theft of property
under $150, like Baldasar's initial offense, constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by not more than a year's imprisonment and a fine of not more than
$1,000. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, $%16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-1(a)(2)
(1975). A second misdemeanor theft offense, however, may be converted into
a felony punishable by up to three years' imprisonment. Id. t1 16-1(e)(1), 1005-

8-1(b)(5), 1005-9-1(a)(1) (1975).

48. Badasar,446 U.S. at 223.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra note 47.
People v. Baldasar, 367 N.E.2d 459 (IMI. App. Ct. 1977).
Baldasar v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 956 (1979).
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223-29 (1980) (per curiam).
See i&
See i&L at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). In his brief concurrence, Jus-

tice Stewart stated that
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rence, also joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, reasoned
that the trial court imposed an increased jail sentence, and
hence "actual imprisonment," as an immediate and direct consequence of Baldasar's prior, uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.ss Since Scott v. Illinois held that an unrepresented
defendant may not be constitutionally sentenced to prison, Justice Marshall concluded that Baldasar's increased sentence similarly violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.56
Justice Marshall phrased the rationale thus:
[a]n uncounseled conviction does not become more reliable merely be-

cause the accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent offense.
For this reason, a conviction which is invalid for purposes of imposing
a sentence of imprisonment for the offense itself remains invalid for
purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment for a subsequent conviction under a repeat-offender statute.57

Justice Blackmun's unjoined concurrence contained a different basis for reversal. He did not subscribe to Justice Marshall's '"hybrid conviction" theory, which characterized
uncounseled misdemeanors as a special class of convictions with
diminished validity, distinct from all other valid convictions.
Instead, Justice Blackmun voted for reversal because he
thought Baldasar's prior misdemeanor, a "non-petty" offense
punishable by up to a year's imprisonment,ms was itsef invalid-unconstitutionally obtained without appointed defense
counsel. 59 In reaching his conclusion, however, Justice Blackmun refused to recognize the majority's rule in Scott, and relied
rather upon the rule he set out in dissent in that case:
an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty
criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and
is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment. 60
[i]n this case the indigent petitioner, after his conviction of petit larceny, was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he
had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.
It seems clear to me that this prison sentence violated the constitutional rule of Scott v. Illinois, and I, therefore, join the opinion and
judgment of the Court.
Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
55. Id. at 226-27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
56. I&
57. Id. at 227-28.
58. See supra note 47.
59. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 229 (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
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In reversing Baldasar's enhanced sentence by declaring the
prior misdemeanor conviction unconstitutional, Justice Blackmun's concurrence represents a conceptual departure from the
other concurrences and from the dissent.
In the dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, refuted the central notion in Justice Marshall's concurrence-that Baldasar's
enhanced sentence resulted directly from the initial uncounseled conviction.6 1 The dissent characterized the additional jail
time as "solely a penalty for the second [counseled] theft."6 2 In
addition, the dissent reasoned that just as constitutionally invalid convictions are invalid for all uses, such as enhancement or
impeachment, Baldasar's valid prior conviction should also be
valid for the purposes of enhancing the sentence for his second
conviction6a
Due to the fractured decision, the dissent predicted confusion and further litigation in Baldasar'swake.6 Because of the
various interpretations a reasonable court may reach regarding
the holding in Baldasar,the dissent's forecast has been proven
accurate.
2. BaldasarApplied: The United States Sentencing
Guidelines, United States v. Eckford, and United
States v. Brady
Like the repeat-offender statute in Baldasa, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines consider prior offenses in determining
sentences, and punish defendants with criminal histories more
harshly than first-time offenders. Under these provisions, a
sentencing court adds together points the Guidelines assign to
61. See 446 U.S. at 231-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
62. Id- at 232. Justice Powell further explainech "If, as in this case, a person with a prior conviction chooses to commit a subsequent crime, he thereby
becomes subject to the increased penalty prescribed for the second crime. This
Court consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the

last offense committed by the defendant" Id. (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895)).
63. ld. at 232-33. Justice Powell supported his view that convictions are

binary by citing Supreme Court cases that, as a whole, have held invalid prior
convictions invalid for all purposes: Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972)
(holding uncounseled felony conviction invalid for impeachment of defendant); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (holding that a sentencing
judge cannot consider a prior, uncounseled felony conviction); Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) (holding uncounseled felony conviction invalid
for sentence enhancement). Baldasar,446 U.S. at 232-33.
64. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 234-35.
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each prior offense.65 The resulting "criminal history score"
then becomes part of the final sentencing equation.66 Ambiguity in Baldasarhas led to conflicting conclusions about whether
federal courts may constitutionally consider prior, uncounseled
misdemeanors to increase a defendant's criminal history score.
Contrary to the Baldasarconcurrences, the November 1990
amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide that
"[pirior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted in
the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor
65. See infra note 66.
66. The determination of a defendant's Criminal History Category and
sentencing range under Chapters Four and Five of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines exemplifies the operation of the wide assortment of recidivist penalty enhancement laws existing today. A description of some of the Sentencing Guidelines' mechanics will allow them to serve as a paradigm.
At sentencing under the Guidelines, the court first calculates a numerical
Offense Level according to the defendant's current conviction. See United
States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Chs.2-3 (Nov. 1991). Offense Levels 1-43 form the vertical axis of a Sentencing Table that governs the
range of imprisonment authorized for a particular offense. See id. Ch.5. After
locating the position of defendant's offense level on the vertical axis of the
Sentencing Table, the court must then calculate the defendant's Criminal History Category. See id. Ch.4. Criminal History Categories 1-6 constitute the
horizontal axis of the Sentencing Table. See i&. Ch.5. The intersection of the
defendant's Offense Level and Criminal History Category on the Sentencing
Table determines the defendant's Guideline Range. See i&i
At every Offense Level, the Sentencing Table lists a series of ranges of
authorized imprisonment, graduated according to the severity of the defendant's Criminal History Category. See i& To calculate a defendant's Criminal
History Category, sentencing courts add together Criminal History Points assigned by the Guidelines to each of a defendant's prior criminal sentences. I&
§ 4A1.1. The more prior criminal activity of which a defendant has been convicted, the more Criminal History Points the Guidelines assign. For example,
for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month,
the Guidelines assign three Criminal History Points. Id. For each prior sentence of between sixty days and one year and one month, the Guidelines assign two Criminal History Points. I&" The Guidelines assign one Criminal
History Point for all other sentences of less than sixty days' imprisonment. Id.
The more Criminal History Points assigned to a defendant, the higher his
or her Criminal History Category will be. The Guidelines place defendants
with 0-1 Criminal History Points in Criminal History Category I; 2-3 Criminal
History Points in Criminal History Category H; 4, 5, and 6 Criminal History
Points in Criminal History Category HI; and so on. See id. Ch.5.
The higher a defendant's Criminal History Category, the higher his or her
sentencing range will be. For instance, at Offense Level 7, a defendant at
Criminal History Category I would be sentenced to between one and seven
months' imprisonment. A defendant at Criminal History Category 11, however, would be sentenced to between two and eight months' imprisonment. At
Criminal History Category V, a defendant convicted at Level 7 could receive
between 12 and 18 months' imprisonment. See id.
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sentences where imprisonment was not imposed."67 These 1990
amendments also deleted the following text expressing doubt

regarding the dictates of Baldasarv. filinois from the application notes following the guideline: "if to count an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a
sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall

not be counted in the criminal history score." 6s In adopting
these amendments, the Sentencing Commission clearly announced its belief that the Constitution permits collateral use
of uncounseled misdemeanors to increase a defendant's criminal history score. The Commission justified its position by arguing that the amendments eliminate disparate application of
the guideline 69 and ensure commensurate punishment for recidivism. 70 The Commission thus abandoned its earlier, more
cautious approach of suspending judgment on the decisive effect of Baldasar in favor of boldly taking a concise yet more
67. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (background).
68. U.S.S.G. App.C n.353.
69. The Sentencing Commission, in adopting the 1990 amendments, was
concerned not only about sentencing courts' disparate interpretations of
whether Baldasar precluded the use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors in
calculating criminal history categories, see ifra note 70, but also about the
sentencing disparity created among courts that excluded uncounseled misdemeanors. In a proposed version of the 1990 amendment, eventually unadopted,
the Sentencing Commission stated as background to § 4A1.2:
To exclude prior sentences resulting from constitutionally valid convictions on the basis of whether the convictions were counseled or uncounseled would create wide disparity (e.g., some jurisdictions
routinely provide counsel in all misdemeanor cases; others do not).
To avoid such disparity by prohibiting use of all misdemeanor convictions not resulting in imprisonment would deprive the court of significant information relevant to the purposes of sentencing.
Fed. Reg., Vol. 55, No. 33 (published February 16, 1990).
70. The Sentencing Commission explained its adoption of the 1990 amendments to § 4A1.2 thus:
This amendment clarifies the circumstances under which prior
sentences are excluded from the criminal history score. In particular,
the amendment clarifies the Commission's intent regarding the counting of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which counsel constitutionally is not required because the defendant was not imprisoned.
Lack of clarity regarding whether these prior sentences are to be
counted may result not only in considerable disparity in guideline application, but also in the criminal history score not adequately reflecting the defendant's failure to learn from the application of previous
sanctions and his potential for recidivism. This amendment expressly
states the Commission's position that such convictions are to be
counted for the purposes of criminal history under Chapter Four,
Part A.
U.S.S.G. App.C n.353.
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constitutionally vulnerable stance. Since the Guidelines instruct sentencing courts to use prior, uncounseled misdemeanors for sentence enhancement without qualification, the
Sentencing Commission effectively adopted the position of the
dissent in Baldasar.u
The Sentencing Commission was not the first authority to
depart from Baldasar. In August 1990, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Eckford 72 that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions not resulting in imprisonment, and therefore valid under Scott v. Illinois,were also valid
for sentence enhancement.7 3 Although Eckford's prior, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions were petty,74 i.e., punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment, the court did
not limit its holding in the manner Justice Blackmun advocated
in his concurrence in Baldasar. Without drawing a distinction
between the constitutionality of petty and non-petty prior convictions, the court in effect held all valid uncounseled misdemeanors equally valid for sentence enhancement. 75 To reach
its decision, the court limited Baldasarto its facts: it held that
Baldasarprecluded a prior, uncounseled misdemeanor from being used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony
with an enhanced prison term. 76
71. The four dissenters in Baldasar would have been the only justices to
condone the Sentencing Commission's position. The plurality would not have
endorsed any collateral use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors in the calculation of criminal history scores; Justice Blackmun would have limited collateral
use to petty, uncounseled misdemeanors. See supm notes 44-64 and accompanying text.

72. 910 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1990). Charles Eckford was charged with attempted bank robbery and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Eckford pled
guilty to attempted bank robbery, the government dropped the unlawful possession charge. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report's recommendation that appellant be sentenced at criminal history
category H, due to two prior, uncounseled municipal court misdemeanor convictions for which Eckford was fined but not jailed. At criminal history level
II, Eckford received a sentence four months longer than the maximum sentence authorized at criminal history I. Id at 217-18.
73. Id at 220.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
75. The Eckford court did not accept Justice Blackmun's concurrence as
representing the holding of Baldasa, consequently, although the Fifth Circuit
mentions that its result does not conflict with Justice Blackmun's concurrence, it expressly avoided limiting its holding to remain consistent with the
concurrence. Eckford, 910 F.2d at 219-20 n.8.
76. Id. at 220. The court noted that it was bound by stare decisis to interpret Baldasarin accordance with previous circuit decisions: "[ilt is well settled
that prior panel decisions of this Court may not be disturbed except on reconsideration en banc." Id at 220 (citing Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 287 (5th
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's 1991 decision in United
States v. Brady7 7 disagreed with the opinions of the Sentencing
Commission and the Fifth Circuit.78 Brady held that the collateral use of uncounseled tribal misdemeanor convictions to depart upward 79 from the Guidelines' recommended sentencing
range violated Brady's right to counsel. 80 Adopting the reasoning of the Justice Marshall's concurrence in Baldasar, the
Brady court formulated its holding broadly, stating that Scott v.
Illinois precluded all imprisonment based upon uncounseled
convictions, either directly or collaterally. 8 ' Since Brady's prior
uncounseled misdemeanors were petty, and therefore indisputably valid,8 2 Brady is inconsistent with the Guidelines,
Cir. 1977); Puckett v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d 1385, 1385 (5th Cir. 1975)). The
court cited as controlling prior decisions United States v. Smith, 844 F.2d 203
(5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. Unit A
1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981); and Thompson v. Estelle,
642 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). I&
77. 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991). Unrepresented by counsel, Charles Brady
was previously convicted of two "petty" misdemeanors, punishable under the
Cheyenne Code of Indian Tribal Offenses by no more than six months' imprisonment or $300. Since in tribal court Brady was not entitled to any absolute
right to counsel, his uncounseled misdemeanor convictions were valid even
though he received a sentence that alternatively imposed a fine or term of imprisonment. I at 853.
78. Just as the Sentencing Guidelines were not the first authority to
seemingly depart from Baldasar,the Fifth Circuit was not the last authority to
adopt the reasoning of the Baldasardissent. In April, 1991 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee declared in United States
v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Tenn. 1991), that because the Baldasaropinion offered no clear guidance about the constitutionality of the Guidelines' advocated policy of including prior, uncounseled misdemeanors in the calculation
of a defendant's criminal history score, and because the Supreme Court has
been silent on the issue since Baldasar,the court could properly adopt what it
deemed the "most appropriate" standard for the right of counsel in sentence
enhancement cases: the one set forth in United States v. Eckford. I&. at 27980; see also supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
79. Tribal convictions are not counted in a defendant's criminal history
category. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§ 4A1.1, comment n.2; § 4A1.2(h) (Nov. 1991); see also Brady, 928 F.2d at 852.
In Brady, the sentencing court made an upward departure in an unspecified
amount from the Guidelines' recommended sentencing range pursuant to
§ 4A1.3, p.s. Id. at 846, 852.
80. Brady, 928 F.2d at 854 (citing Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)).
81. Id. The court cites two cases in addition to Baldasarto support its rationale: United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (holding unconstitutional
sentence enhancement using prior uncounseled felony convictions) and United
States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Baldasarto hold unconstitutional the collateral use of uncounseled juvenile offenses to enhance subsequent sentences in adult proceedings), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1037 (1990).
82. See supra note 77.
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Eckford,s3 and Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Balasar.
II.

CRITICISM OF PRIOR INTERPRETATIONS
OF BALDASAR

The division of opinion in Baldasarhas created considerable confusion, as the contradictory holdings from courts purporting to follow the case's authority evidence.84 Although the
decision has spawned several irreconcilable interpretations, all
ultimately fail to read Baldasarin a manner true to its text and
intent.
A.

UNITED STATES V. BRADY: INCoRRECT APPLICATION

OF BALDASAR
United States v. Brady offered criminal defendants the
most expansive right to counsel possible under the Baldasardecision: Brady held all constitutionally valid, uncounseled misdemeanors invalid to enhance subsequent sentences, because
uncounseled convictions are never reliable enough to support
imprisonment, collateral or otherwise.85 Although this interpretation of the Baldasarrule enjoys the status of being the rationale in which the 'greatest number of concurring justices
joined, five justices disagreed with this formulation of the rule
and its rationale. The four dissenters in Baldasar would have
reasoned that since the criminal proceedings leading to Brady's
initial convictions did not violate Brady's right to counsel, these
valid prior convictions would also have been valid to enhance
his sentence for a subsequent offense under the Guidelines.86
Justice Blackmun would have similarly held collateral enhancement constitutional in Brady. Brady's two prior, uncounseled misdemeanor charges were punishable by a maximum of
six months' imprisonment; as such, they were "petty," and
therefore constitutional under Justice Blackmun's rule in Scott.
Because Brady's prior convictions were valid, Justice Blackmun
would likely have held such convictions also valid for sentence
enhancement.8 7 Since a majority of the Baldasar Court would
have disagreed with the result, the Ninth Circuit decided Brady
incorrectly.
83. Indeed, the Brady court cites the holding of United States v. Eckford

contra to its holding. 928 F.2d at 854.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra note 13 (citing contradictory cases).
See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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B. UNITED STATES V. EcKuORD: CoRRECT RESULT, INCORRECT
INTERPRETATION

Another interpretation of Baldasar limits the case to its
facts. The court in United States v. Eckford described Baldasar
as standing only for the proposition that "a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction may not [be] used under an enhanced
penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanorinto a felony with a prison term."s The Eckford court based its characterization upon a largely semantic distinction between
enhancement under state law and enhancement under Chapter
Five of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Some repeat-offender statutes, like the Illinois statute in Baldasar, enhance
sentences by converting a subsequent misdemeanor charge into
a felony charge, thereby triggering a greater prison term-s9 The
Guidelines, however, do not employ "misdemeanor" or "felony"
classifications, but rather determine prison sentences by grading defendants with numerical criminal history categories.9
Regardless of the differences in nomenclature, the effect of all
the systems is the same: they increase the punishment of repeat offenders.
The Fifth Circuit therefore erroneously distinguished
Baldasarfrom Eckford. The Scott "actual imprisonment" standard enjoined courts from incarcerating defendants on uncounseled convictions. 91 The reversal of Baldasar's conviction
hinged only on that but for the collateral use of his prior, uncounseled misdemeanor, the trial court would not have increased his term of imprisonment. The reversal did not rest
upon the rationale that the collateral use would have imposed
the burden of being graded a felon rather than a misdemeanant. The concurrences contain strong language refuting the
limitation of Baldasarthat Eckford suggests.92 Had the court
88. United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added) (quoting Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980), cert
denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981)).
89. See supra note 47 (describing Illinois' sentence-enhancing statute).
90. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§ 4A1.1 and Ch.5, PLA (Nov. 1991).
91. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
92. For example, Justice Stewart's concurrence states:
In this case the indigent petitioner, after his conviction of petit larceny, was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he
had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.
It seems clear to me that this prison sentence violated the constitutional rule of Scott v. Illinois.
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enhanced Baldasar's subsequent offense to a high misdemeanor
carrying an increased term of imprisonment, rather than to a
felony, the result of the case would undoubtedly have been the
93
same.
After incorrectly dismissing the controlling influence of
Baldasar, the Eckford court advanced the Baldasar dissent's
theory that prior misdemeanor convictions valid under Scott
should be valid for all purposes, including sentence enhancement.94 The Fifth Circuit failed to note, however, that
Eckford's prior convictions were petty misdemeanors for which
he received no term of imprisonment.95 In simply distinguishing Bakkasar, the Fifth Circuit perhaps failed to appreciate that
the BaldasarCourt would have reached the same result had it
decided Eckford. Justice Blackmun would have held Eckford's
petty uncounseled misdemeanors valid for collateral enhancement.96 To the extent that Eckford involved petty prior misdemeanors valid under Blackmun's rule in Scott, the case reaches
the correct result by following the most restrictive formulation
of the holding in Baldasar.9 7 The reasoning in Eclcford, however, remains faulty and the holding unnecessarily broad,
thereby contributing to the murky state of the law under
Baldasar.
III. THE UNRESOLVABLE AMBIGUITY OF BALDASAR
AND PROPOSAL FOR CLARIFICATION
A. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF BALDAsAR

The irreconcilable manner in which the Court split in
Baldasarhas led to uneven application and strained interpretaBaldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). Justice Marshall's concurrence
states,
I think it plain that petitioner's prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of
imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction.... [A] rule that held a
conviction invalid for imposing a prison term directly, but valid for
imposing a prison term collaterally, would be an illogical and unworkable deviation from our previous cases.
Id. at 225-26, 228-29 (footnote omitted).
93. See Rudstein, supra note 29, at 530-31 (arguing that the additional
term of imprisonment, rather than the nature of the offense, controlled the
Baldasardecision).
94. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
97. See iiftu note 101 and accompanying text (explaining why Justice
Blackmun's concurrence contains the narrowest formulation of the Baldasar
holding).
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tion of the decision in the lower courts. A close examination of
Baldasarreveals that the decision fails to support any rule governing the collateral use of uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions.
Under any of the various interpretations of the rule in
Baldasar,98 Justice Blackmun's concurrence occupies a pivotal
position. For instance, the interpretations of Baldasar in
Eckford and Brady, although opposed to each other, both contradict Justice Blackmun's concurrence. Still another interpretation of Baldasar advances Justice Blackmun's concurrence
itself as being the correct holding of the case.99 Because of its
centrality, the unresolvable ambiguity in Justice Blackmun's
opinion renders the entire Baldasardecision unworkable.
Of the rationales supporting reversal in Baldasar,Justice
Blackmun's theory represented the narrowest ground, since he
approved the reversal of some, but not all, sentences enhanced
by uncounseled misdemeanors. 0 0 If the narrowest ground
upon which all the concurring justices can agree may be said to
be the appropriate formulation of the holding, then Baldasar
held the collateral use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors for
sentence enhancement unconstitutional, only in cases where
the prior misdemeanor was a non-petty offense, punishable by
more than six months' imprisonment.10 ' Unfortunately, Jus98. For a description of interpretations of Baldasaraside from the ones in
Eckford and Brady, see generally, Joseph R. Podraza, Jr., Using Prior Un-

counseled Convictions to Enhance the Grading and Sentencing of Subsequent
Offenses Resulting in Imprisonment The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
QuestionableReading of Baldasarv. Illinois, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 331, 344-49 (1987);

Rudstein, supra note 29, at 530-35.
99. See Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 889
(10th Cir. 1985).

100. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
101.

This version of the Baldasar holding, fairly attributable to Justice

Blackmun, seems to be the most cautious of all: the formulation is fact-specific and represents the least common denominator upon which all five concurring justices could have agreed. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.... ."' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Indeed, the Eckford court noted that by this rule
of interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted Justice
Blackmun's concurrence as the holding of Baldasar. United States v. Eckford,
910 F.2d 216, 219-20 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Santillanes v. United States Pa-

role Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1985)). Having noted the plausibility
of such a holding, however, the Eckford court nevertheless did not agree with
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tice Blackmun's concurrence is internally inconsistent, and
even this narrow formulation of the Baldasar rule must be
rejected.
Justice Blackmun's rule in Baldasar renders the class of
nonpetty misdemeanor convictions, currently constitutional
under Scott v. Illinois if not accompanied by a term of imprisonment, unconstitutional for collateral use. Under this proposal, uncounseled nonpetty convictions in effect become
"hybrid" convictions, 10 2 since they would be constitutionally
valid for some purposes, but constitutionally invalid for others.
The four other justices concurring in Baldasar embraced
the "hybrid" conviction theory to justify their result, and conceded that the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard represented binding precedent. 10 3 Significantly, however, Justice
Blackmun did not join the "hybrid" theory concurrences to
reverse Baldasar's conviction and sentence. In refusing to recognize the Scott standard and instead assailing the constitutionality of Baldasar's prior conviction, Justice Blackmun found a
way to express dissatisfaction with the reliability of uncounseled non-petty convictions while conveniently avoiding the
further step of declaring some convictions constitutionally valid
for some purposes but invalid for others. By implication, Justice Blackmun is the fifth justice to reject the "hybrid" conviction theory, ironically rendering his own opinion contradictory
and unsuited to constitute the holding of Baldasar.
The crux of the problem in Baldasaris Justice Blackmun's
rejection of the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard to govern
misdemeanants' right to counsel. Justice Blackmun's reconsideration of the Scott standard, and his subsequent determination
that Baldasar's nonpetty conviction ran afoul of the right to
counsel in its original proceeding, were not considerations
Santillanes that a discernable rationale representing a least common denominator among five justices existed. 910 F.2d at 220 n.8.
102. Justice Powell makes this criticism of Justice Marshall's concurrence:
[t]he Court creates a special class of uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. Those judgments are valid for the purposes of their own
penalties as long as the defendant receives no prison term. But the
Court holds that these convictions are invalid for the purpose of enhancing punishment upon a subsequent misdemeanor conviction.
By creating this new hybrid, the Court departs from the position
it took after Gideon v. Wainwright.
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
103. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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proper to the disposition of the case. 10 4 Scott remains unreviewed and thus continues to define the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. 10 5 As long as courts respect stare decisis by

104. The Court did not decide these issues for adjudication, since petitioner
did not collaterally challenge the constitutionality of his prior convictions but
instead conceded their validity. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 234 n.2 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
105. The propriety of the Scott standard affects the propriety of allowing
the collateral use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors. Adoption of the
Baldasar dissent's theory that valid misdemeanor convictions should be valid
for all purposes exposes the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard's potentially
inadequate protection of a defendant's due process rights. As recognized in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, congested courts often dispose of misdemeanor cases
with undue haste and lack of care. 407 U.S. 25, 34-37 (1972). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that without counsel, few laypersons can
conduct a successful defense in a criminal proceeding. See Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). Hence, in misdemeanor cases, an innocent, unrepresented defendant runs some risk of an unreliable conviction. The Court in
Argersinger and Scott mitigated this risk by assuring accused misdemeanants
that they will not be jailed in such potentially unreliable proceedings. See
supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
Although the "hybrid" misdemeanor conviction theory in Baldasarshould
be rejected and all valid prior convictions should be available for collateral
use, justice demands the reconsideration of the Scott "actual imprisonment"
standard governing the validity of uncounseled misdemeanors in the original
proceedings. As it currently stands, Scott not only allows potentially unreliable convictions to lead to sentence enhancement, it more importantly allows
the state to take a defendant's property and harm his reputation as a direct
penalty for such a conviction.
The Scott Court chose the "actual imprisonment" standard from several
other proposed standards. For instance, Justice Brennan suggested an "authorized imprisonment" standard in his dissent to the case. Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367, 381-89 (1979). Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, suggested
an absolute right to counsel for non-petty misdemeanors and an "actual imprisonment" standard for petty misdemeanors. See id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell recommended the "case-by-case" standard he first
introduced in his concurrence in Argersingerv. Hamlin. Id at 374-75 (Powell,
J., concurring).
None of these alternative standards is superior to the "actual imprisonment" standard. Justice Brennan's "authorized imprisonment" standard
would require appointed counsel whenever an indigent is charged with an offense punishable by jail time. Although this standard offers the greatest protection of accused misdemeanants, it would probably result in the unwise
distribution of limited court-appointed defense counsel resources. Furnished
counsel would be squandered indiscriminately on simple cases, cases in which
the evidence is overwhelming, or cases in which incarceration is improbable.
This distribution would in turn channel precious defender resources away
from other misdemeanor cases where incarceration is likely or the issues
presented are complex.
Justice Blackmun's standard would burden defender resources less than
Justice Brennan's standard since Justice Blackmun would not grant petty misdemeanants a right to counsel unless they were actually incarcerated. Justice
Blackmun's standard, however, would nonetheless result in an unwise distri-
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recognizing the constitutional validity of both petty and
nonpetty uncounseled misdemeanors not directly resulting in
imprisonment, the internal conflict of Baldasar,and the uncertainty of its authority, will remain unremedied.
Ultimately, the Baldasardecision offers no more than extremely weak and controversial guidance to legislative bodies
and lower courts. The court in United States v. Robles-Sandoval accurately summed up the consequence of Baldasar. "[t]he
Court in Baldasar divided in such a way that no rule can be
said to have resulted." 1°6 In the absence of Supreme Court
clarification of Baldasar, lower courts necessarily must continue to flounder in uncertainty.
bution of available counsel, because the class of defendants to which the standard would afford the right of counsel would not necessarily be the one most
needy of representation. Although one may argue that a defendant charged
with a nonpetty misdemeanor, therefore potentially facing more than six
months' imprisonment, needs an attorney more than a defendant charged with
a petty offense, the severity of the punishment authorized for the crime has
little to do with the complexity of the case, or with the severity of the actual
sentence. Many defendants charged with non-petty offenses may have simple
cases, or be more likely to receive a small fine.
Trial courts are in the best position to allocate defense resources efficiently by determining whether court-appointed counsel is necessary in any
particular case. Unfettered trial courts' discretion Justice Powell suggested,
however, is problematic. Imprisonment is a penalty so severe that an unrepresented defendant should never be sentenced to jail. Any standard that does
not guarantee the "actual imprisonment" standard as a minimum should violate due process. The protection of defendant's fundamental right to liberty
should not be entrusted to the sole discretion of state trial courts, which have
been historically insensitive to defendant's rights.
The Scott "actual imprisonment" standard serves as an acceptable minimum level of due process, but it is vulnerable to two objections. First, the
standard allows for the collateral use of an uncounseled misdemeanor for sentence enhancement, as long as the misdemeanor did not result in a jail term.
The standard ignores the prior conviction's reliability in light of its complexity
or its hasty disposition. Second, upon similar reasoning, the "actual imprisonment" standard allows potentially unreliable convictions to lead to conviction
and probation or fines.
Adopting the "actual imprisonment" standard as a base-line rule and then
making a case-by-case determination of the right to counsel for non-imprisonment cases would provide optimal protection of defendants and insure the equitable distribution of defender resources to needy cases. The standard would
void uncounseled misdemeanors resulting in actual imprisonment. Unreliable
misdemeanors that did not result in jail time, but did result in harsh fines or
collateral sentence enhancement, may be challenged by raising defendant's
constitutional right to counsel. Appellate courts could then review trial
courts' right to counsel determinations to determine the reliability of the conviction without counsel and the soundness of the trial courts' discretion after
the admission of evidence.
106. United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981).
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B. PROPOSAL FOR CLARIFICATION BY REVIEW
Because recidivist enhancement provisions are so "commonplace in our criminal justice system,"' 7 the difficulty commentators and lower courts have had deriving the rule
emerging from BaZdasar v. Illinois presents a significant problem. If the Baldasar rule is as the concurring justices state it,
then a fundamental right of many accused recidivists goes unprotected. If the Baldwaar rule is as the dissenters state it, repeat offenders in some jurisdictions go unpunished while
equally culpable repeat offenders in other jurisdictions receive
significant added jail time. Widespread disparity and inequity
mandate Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of the
collateral use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors to enhance
subsequent sentences.
Upon review, the Supreme Court should adopt the position
of the dissenting justices. Insurmountable problems exist with
accepting the Baldasar concurrences. The position of Justice
Marshall's concurrence, that Scott v. Illinois mandates the creation of a class of "hybrid" uncounseled misdemeanor convictions valid for initial conviction and for imposing fines, but
invalid to support a term of imprisonment and to collaterally
enhance a later sentence, should be rejected for several

reasons.
Although Scott precludes the direct imposition of a term of
imprisonment for an uncounseled misdemeanor, it does not
necessarily follow that Scott also precludes the use of the misdemeanor to determine whether additional imprisonment is
warranted for a second, counseled conviction. Incarceration resulting from the collateral use of an uncounseled misdemeanor
is not equivalent to incarceration directly imposed for an uncounseled misdemeanor. Collaterally imposed incarceration requires the intervening link of a subsequent counseled
conviction, often of a similar offense.10 8 Justice Powell's dissent in Baldasar noted this distinction between a direct sentence of imprisonment and one collaterally imposed: "[i]f... a
person with a prior conviction chooses to commit a subsequent
crime, he thereby becomes subject to the increased penalty prescribed for the second crime. This Court consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only the last offense
107. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
108. Cf.Rudstein, supra note 29, at 530 & n.63.
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committed by the defendant."'1 9
Hence, collateral sentences of imprisonment should not be
subjected to the same rigorous due process requirements as
direct sentences. In direct imprisonment, a wholly innocent
person accused of a crime runs an unreasonable risk of incarceration unless he is provided with defense counsel. The very
bases of free society demand the stringent application of procedural safeguards to avoid imprisoning an innocent defendant.
In a collateral enhancement case, however, a defendant receives representation. The state must prove its case and meet
all procedural safeguards before any sentence is imposed.
Therefore, even in a hypothetical worst case in which a prior
conviction was entirely unreliable, the government would not
imprison an innocent person, but would only sentence a defendant already proven guilty of a crime to a term of imprisonment
potentially longer than statutorily warranted for the convicted
offense. Although one may argue that such a result nonetheless would be unfair, the injustice that may result from direct
sentencing upon an uncounseled conviction would be immediate and vastly more egregious. The due process principles in
Scott that preclude direct imprisonment for an uncounseled
misdemeanor are of a different magnitude than those applicable in Baldasar. The Scott principles do not necessarily mandate the preclusion of collateral sentence enhancement.
By no means does the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard governing the right to counsel afford uncounseled defendants absolute protection from punishment. Although the
standard precludes direct imprisonment for an uncounseled
misdemeanor, a court may still impose significant fines and the
stigma of conviction upon an unrepresented defendant.110 As
previously discussed, enhancing the sentence of a guilty defendant already sentenced to prison is a sanction much less harsh
than the direct imprisonment of an unrepresented defendant.
If placed in a spectrum of punishment severity, extra prison
time added to an already existent sentence corresponds more
closely to the direct imposition of a very large fine or to being
branded a convict than to sending an innocent person to jail. It
is inconsistent to hold that the imposition of severe direct sanc109. Baklasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Oyler v. Boles,

368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 (1895)).

110. For a list of sources detailing the possible consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring in the result).
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tions against an unrepresented, indigent defendant does not offend due process under Scott, but also hold that the similarly
severe collateral imprisonment of a represented defendant
transgresses those identical principles.
Furthermore, because of the heightened moral culpability
of repeat offenders and the social consideration of general and
specific deterrence, the criminal justice system should encourage effective enhancement laws to punish recidivism. The
position taken by Justices Stewart, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens in Baldasar"' would hamper this goal significantly. In
adopting the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard, Justice
Powell noted the scarcity of court-appointed defender resources, especially in urban areas. 1 2 Often trial judges must
hand down sentences to convicted misdemeanants that do not
include a term of imprisonment even though incarceration is
merited, simply because public defender shortages mean a certain number of misdemeanor cases cannot proceed with appointed counsel." 3 Further injustice and social harm would
result if judges must additionally forego enhancing the
sentences of subsequently convicted misdemeanants who have
initially escaped incarceration because of defender shortages.
Alternatively, courts may distribute defender resources imprudently if, anticipating a bar on the collateral use of an uncounseled misdemeanor, they allot counsel to simple or trivial cases
merely to preserve the conviction's validity for penalty
enhancement.
In addition to impairing the ability of criminal justice systems to punish recidivism, prohibiting the use of uncounseled
misdemeanors under penalty enhancement provisions would
create wide disparities in sentencing because of varying procedural practices of different jurisdictions. For example, some
misdemeanor courts do not keep a record of whether convic111. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.

112. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
113. The Argersingerrule also tends to impair the proper functioning
of the criminal justice system in that trial judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except
the charge, all too often will be compelled to forgo the legislatively

granted option to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction.
Preserving this option by providing counsel often will be impossible
or impracticable-particularly in congested urban courts where scores

of cases are heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be available.
Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tions proceeded with court-appointed counsel." 4 Subsequent
sentencing courts would need to depend upon the memory and
sincerity of the defendants themselves in determining whether
prior misdemeanors from these courts were uncounseled, and
therefore excludable for collateral use.31 5 Because of divergent
record-keeping practices, sentencing disparities may arise between similarly culpable defendants on the mere basis of misdemeanor jurisdiction, or the honesty or recollection of the
defendant.
Even if records of counsel appointment were available, the
exclusion of prior uncounseled misdemeanors from collateral
use may create sentencing disparity because the presence of defense counsel at prior misdemeanor proceedings is a poor proxy
for defendant culpability. Such sentencing disparity would be
most evident under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, where
sentence enhancement involves consideration of misdemeanor
convictions from the full array of American jurisdictions. Some
jurisdictions routinely assign defense counsel to misdemeanors
not resulting in imprisonment, others do not;" 6 yet others cannot assign defense counsel to misdemeanor cases that strongly
warrant sentences of imprisonment because of lack of resources. 117 By excluding the collateral use of prior misdemeanors solely on the basis of whether they were counseled,
similarly culpable defendants with prior convictions from different jurisdictions would receive disparate sentences, depending only on the characteristics of the public defender system of
the jurisdiction." 8
M4.

See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216

(5th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-4862) (stating that "[m]unicipal courts in the State of
Mississippi are not courts 'of record,' hence they are relatively informal and no
verbatim transcripts are made of their proceedings. Nor are written waivers of
counsel the norm in those courts."); United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277,
278 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (assuming no waiver of counsel because record from
misdemeanor court was silent).
115. For example, in Eckford, no record of appellant's waiver of counsel
existed from the municipal court that convicted him of his prior misdemeanor.
See Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.
1990) (No. 89-482). At sentencing for his subsequent offense, Eckford
did not deny being advised of his right to counsel, nor did he deny
that he knowingly waived that right. He testified only that he could
not recall, after six years, whether he orally waived that right or not,
or even the identity of the judge who took his plea.
I&.
116. See supra note 69.
117. See supra note 113.
118. The United States Sentencing Commission expressed concern for this
kind of sentencing disparity when it proposed its 1990 amendments to the Fed-
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This Note advocates Supreme Court clarification of
Baldasar v. Illinois. In its reconsideration, the Court should
declare all misdemeanor convictions, valid when originally obtained, equally valid for the purpose of collaterally enhancing
sentences under subsequent convictions. In addition to being
conceptually sound, such a position heeds precedent, effectuates
important sentencing policy, and fosters wise distribution of
public defender resources.
To hold properly obtained, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions valid for all purposes avoids the conceptually contrived
position of creating two distinct classes of convictions-those
that are "normal" convictions, and those that are only limited
"hybrid" convictions, ineffective for collateral sentence enhancement. Convictions seem more logically binary--either
the defendant is guilty or the defendant is innocent. The
Supreme Court has held constitutionally improper convictions
invalid for all purposes because they are void.119 Reciprocally,
constitutionally proper convictions should be held valid for all
purposes, because they are not void.
This conceptual flaw indicates more underlying trouble in
the Baldasar concurrences. The necessity of creating a lesser
class of valid convictions, unavailable for collateral use, reflects
a reluctance by the concurring justices to accept the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard. Although Scott represented, and
still represents, the standard defining the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases, the concurring Baldasarjustices must have
viewed the Scott standard as inadequately protecting defendants' rights. 120 In rendering uncounseled misdemeanors invalid
for collateral enhancement, these justices attempted to mitigate
the harshness of the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard by
reducing the potency of these otherwise valid convictions.
A position that convictions valid under Scott are valid also
for collateral sentence enhancement acknowledges that the
Scott standard is binding law. This position further recognizes
that any unjust enhancement resulting from collateral use is
fairly attributable to the failure of the Scott standard to adequately protect defendants' rights in the original conviction, not
to repeat-offender statutes' collateral use of valid convictions
eral Sentencing Guidelines, instructing district courts to include prior uncoun-

seled misdemeanors in criminal history calculations. See supra note 69.

119. See cases cited suprm note 63.
120. See Bakasar,446 U.S. at 225-26 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating "I

remain convinced that [Scott] was wrongly decided"). For a discussion of the
flaws in the Scott standard, see supra note 105.
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for enhancement.'21 Dissatisfaction with the Scott standard
may militate for legislative or even judicial reform of the right
to counsel in misdemeanor cases; however, it should not justify
the adoption of an unsound position with regard to the collateral use of valid prior convictions.
Under Scott, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions that do
not result in incarceration are valid to directly impose fines,
probation, and a conviction record on a defendant. If such consequences may attach to an uncounseled conviction, the law
must certainly regard them as substantially reliable.122 In a
subsequent conviction, sentencing courts should be able to view
as likely indicators of recidivist behavior substantially reliable
convictions that are recorded as valid.m Since the policy of
punishing recidivist behavior is so crucial to our system of criminal justice, sentencing courts should be able to consider reliable convictions to arrive at commensurate sentences.
Most penalty enhancement laws, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, utilize prior convictions only to enlarge the
range of punishment authorized for particular offenses;' 2 ' consequently, a court has much discretion to determine if it will
actually increase a defendant's jail term. Since subsequent offenses are counseled, defense attorneys have the opportunity to
highlight the potential unreliability of prior convictions, and to
mitigate or eliminate the likelihood that judges will sentence at
the greater end of a sentencing range enhanced by a prior uncounseled misdemeanor. If all validly procured convictions
121. For a proposal of a right-to-counsel standard more protective of criminal defendants' due process rights than the Scott "actual imprisonment" standard, see supra note 105.
122. For instance, because the uncounseled conviction may be unspecified
as such on record, see supra note 114, one would justifiably expect that an employer will take notice of a defendant's criminal history and will draw conclusions regarding the defendant's character that may dissuade the employer
from hiring the defendant.
123. Indeed, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a court's consideration of "reliable information [that] indicates that the criminal history
category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past
criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes" to support an upward departure from the otherwise applicable guideline range. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§ 4A1.3, p.s. (Nov. 1991). Such "reliable information" includes information
concerning "foreign" or "tribal offenses," "misconduct established by a civil
adjudication," and "prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a
criminal conviction." Id- (emphasis added). Surely, conduct actually leading
to a conviction is an inherently more reliable indicator of recidivism than such
evidence of prior conduct.
124. See provisions cited supra note 66.
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were considered valid for sentence enhancement, sentencing
courts could fully consider a defendant's prior convictions to assess how much to enhance a sentence, if at all.125 A contrary

position would mechanically exclude all collateral consideration
of prior uncounseled misdemeanors, regardless of how reliable,
frustrating the goal of punishing recidivism.'
To carry out sentencing policy that efficiently and effectively punishes recidivism, all validly procured prior misdemeanors should be valid for sentence enhancement. Such a
policy fosters the wise distribution of scarce defender resources
by discouraging courts from appointing counsel to misdemeanor
cases solely to ensure the conviction's validity for future collateral use. For instance, courts should allocate defender resources to cases presenting legal issues which are too complex
for a pro se defendant to manage, where circumstances strongly
indicate that an appropriate sentence should include a term of
imprisonment, or where fines and other punishment would
pose atypical hardship for the defendant. Indiscriminate distribution of defender resources would inevitably channel defense
counsel away from more deserving cases to cases where counsel
is less critical to ensure fair proceedings.
CONCLUSION
In Baldasarv. Illinois, the Supreme Court purportedly invalidated the collateral use of prior, uncounseled misdemeanors
to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense as a violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Baklasar,however, was
a murky per curiam decision containing four separate opinions.
The fractured decision left the scope and authority of the case
highly ambiguous. Lower federal courts and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have found little guidance in Baklasar to
help resolve constitutional challenges to the collateral use of
uncounseled misdemeanors. As a result, these courts have applied Baldasarerratically. The Ninth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, for example, have interpreted Balasarin ways that are
diametrically opposed to each other. The crucial question unresolved in Baldasaraffects the scope of a constitutional right
125. Sentencing courts may already rightfully consider a variety of reasonably reliable indications of prior criminal activity, aside from convictions. See
supra note 123; ef infin note 126.
126. For a contrary perspective and a thoughtful discussion of the closely
related issue of judicial sentencing discretion in the absence of a penalty enhancement statute, see Rudstein, supra note 29, at 535-42.
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of a great number of criminal defendants sentenced under state
repeat offender statutes and the criminal history provisions of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The unsolvable ambiguity in Baldasarand the considerable
injustice resulting from it necessitate Supreme Court review.
This Note asserts that adopting the rationale of the dissent in
BalZasar-that all constitutionally procured, uncounseled misdemeanor convictions should be constitutional for sentence enhancement-would yield clarity in the law and a result sound
in principle and policy.

